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Investment arbitration liability insurance:  








Regulatory chill, one of the key tensions between international investment agreements (IIAs) and 
democratic governance, could be dealt with by creating liability insurance for governments. 
Regulatory chill occurs when governments refrain from adopting certain measures out of fear 
that these would trigger costly arbitration disputes with affected foreign investors. Importantly, 
since IIAs often contain standards of treatment that create uncertainties about how an arbitration 
panel would interpret and apply them, governments might even refrain from measures that would 
have been found to be consistent with their obligations if challenged in arbitration. Though 
clarifying these standards could, theoretically, mitigate such concerns, efforts to do so have had 
limited success and could reduce the protection provided to investors. 
 
Liability insurance for investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) could protect governments’ 
policy space while maintaining the protection granted to foreign investors by IIAs. By offering 
governments partial indemnification for their losses in arbitration, the risk of liability would be 
alleviated. 
 
Governments already use liability insurance in other contexts. As government immunity from 
tort liability has diminished, local governments across the US have begun purchasing liability 
insurance. This has allowed them to avoid devastating consequences if found liable for 
significant damages. Insurance is acquired from private carriers or by joining municipal risk 
pools, commonly sponsored and administered by non-profit organizations, which enable several 
municipalities to join together and pay premiums in return for liability coverage.  
 
Important examples of such insurance are errors and omissions (E&O) policies that provide 
coverage for any act of neglect or breach of duty. They may cover claims that arise from 
decisions made by elected or appointed officials that allegedly cause loss of revenue or property 
rights, including planning and zoning issues.
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 Similar claims may constitute breaches of IIA 
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obligations to provide foreign investors fair and equitable treatment and to refrain from indirect 
expropriation. ISDS liability insurance could provide a sort of E&O insurance to participating 
governments in the event of certain ISDS claims.  
 
While insurance could mitigate concerns of a regulatory chill, concern with moral hazard may 
limit its practicality. An insurer would worry that insured governments might not act as carefully 
toward foreign investors as they would in absence of insurance. In theory, the insurance could 
exclude deliberate violations of IIAs. However, ascertaining intent is likely to be impossible, and 
efforts to do so might undermine its purpose of enhancing predictability. Therefore, the insurer 
would use objective criteria to determine what types of measures should be covered by the 
policy. For example, insurance could be limited to measures that promote clearly defined public 
interests such as public health. In addition, experience from E&O policies shows that there may 
be other ways of addressing moral hazard concerns. First, insurance policies could have coverage 
limits and large deductibles, thus exposing governments to a certain risk. Additionally, premiums 
could be determined in relation to the level of care countries adopt by considering losses in 
arbitration and could be linked to the characteristics of each country's IIAs. These safeguards 
would reduce concerns of moral hazard, though still limit the possible consequences of each 
arbitration claim.  
 
As E&O policies, such insurance could be provided either by private carriers or by a risk pool 
established by multiple governments. Theoretically, a risk pool could provide cheaper insurance 
since it does not seek to make a profit. Although a competitive insurance market might lower 
costs by pricing risk more effectively, an ISDS liability insurance market may not be large 
enough to ensure competition.  
 
A risk pool could operate similarly to regional disaster risk insurance programs, such as the 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF). The CCRIF allows participating 
countries to pool their specific catastrophe risks into one diversified portfolio. Aside from an 
initial funding from donors, it is based on premiums that are calculated according to each 
country's risk profile that assesses the probability of a catastrophe, based on its characteristics 
and historical events. Though the CCRIF is not subject to moral hazard as an ISDS insurance 
pool, its general structure could be similar: the ongoing activity could be funded by premiums 
that are based on each country's ISDS experience, IIAs and desired coverage. 
 
Clearly, such a plan demands the participation of several countries. Though large countries may 
prefer self-insurance, others may be inclined to participate, especially once experiencing 
regulatory chill, even if an actual arbitration claim was not filed. Nevertheless, if insurance rates 
were high and equal for all countries, a country that does not foresee a probable risk of 
arbitration might not be inclined to purchase such insurance. The above guidelines would likely 
increase the number of countries that might find such insurance attractive. It would allow them to 
strive for more regulatory space and mitigation of risks of regulatory chill caused by IIAs, while 
still promoting investment and protecting their investors abroad.  
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Often, the choice between policy space and foreign investor protection through IIAs is described 
as a zero-sum game. Introducing insurance into this game may achieve the impossible: assuring 
policy space while not reducing the protection granted to investors. 
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